

Promoting Sound Governance in Marine and Coastal Areas: Lessons from Tanzania

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Abstract

The United Republic of Tanzania embarked on a comprehensive initiative to promote sound governance of the country's offshore and nearshore areas in 2005 with support from the World Bank and the Global Environmental Facility. The project entitled Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project (MACEMP) was initially designed for six years, but continued implementation for further two years. This article makes an assessment of the achievements during the eight years relative to project goals to promote sound governance. A particular focus is made on the lessons learned that may be of relevance for similar projects in the region and elsewhere.

Key Words: Governance, Ecosystem Management, Scaling up, migratory fisheries, Marine Conservation Areas

Introduction

The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania is a unitary republic consisting of the Union Government and the Zanzibar Revolutionary Government. The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty emphasizes income poverty, unemployment, non-income poverty, vulnerability, environmental sustainability and HIV/AIDS. The desired outcomes of the strategy include growth and poverty reduction, improved quality of life, good governance and accountability.

The coastal and marine environment is endowed with a rich diversity of coral reefs, seagrass beds, mangroves and cultural resources. Marine resources are critical to the country's economic and social development. Coastal communities rely heavily on the marine environment for their food and income. The key legislative enactments forming the governance framework of the marine and coastal environment can be described as follows: Fisheries Acts of Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, the Deep Sea Fishing Authority Act, the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act. The DSFA Act did not become effective until 2006. The establishment of a common governance regime for the EEZ was a critical issue from 1989 to 2006. Other important Acts include the Marine Parks and Reserves Act of 1994, the Integrated Coastal Environmental Management Strategy (NICEMS) of 2003. Figure 1 depicts maps of Tanzania, coastal areas of mainland Tanzania including Zanzibar comprising the two islands of Unguja and Pemba; and map of Zanzibar.

Tanzania was linked to or participant of a number of national and regional projects and programs which formed a broader governance framework. They included the South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project (SWIOF) the Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF), the South Africa Development Community (SADC) Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) project, the GEF supported Global Coral Reef Targeted Research and Capacity Building for Management Project and the GEF and UNDP supported Agulhas and Somali Current Large Marine Ecosystems project.

Figure 1: Maps depicting Tanzania, Zanzibar and the islands of Unguja and Pemba



Issues

The main issues in the marine and coastal environment involved reduced income poverty, lack of local empowerment and poor emphasis on environmental management. Poverty reduction was the government's highest priority. However, this required improving the integrity of the offshore as well as near-shore resource base. Sound management of the offshore areas requires harmonizing regulatory regime of fisheries towards increasing resource rents and the effectiveness of rent capture. Near-shore management required designing and implementing a system of managed marine areas that includes Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), Marine Conservation Areas (MCAs), and managed fishery areas (Beach Management Units and Co-managed Areas).

Although Tanzania's policy and legislative frameworks promoting sound governance of the marine and coastal areas were largely in place, and numerous international donors had been active in this area for about one decade, a number of issues posed a challenge to efficient and productive resource management in these areas. Of these, the following were the most critical at the time the Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project was being conceived.

Increasing foreign interests in migratory fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)¹, the lack of ratification of the Deep Sea Fishing Act (DSFA) and the lack of capacity to monitor fishing vessels of the Deep Sea Fishing Nations (DSFN) led to an open access situation in the EEZ. This situation was leading to loss of revenue for Tanzania and to the potential collapse of valuable migratory fisheries in the South Western Indian Ocean².

Growing coastal populations, pressure from neighboring fishing fleets, demand for fish from the growing tourist industry and a growing middle and wealthy population in cities placed increasing pressures on the near-shore. The situation was exacerbated by the lack of capacity and

operational budgets for monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS). Unplanned development along the coast, pollution from land based sources, unsustainable fishing practices and lack of clear access rights added to the weak governance situation in the near-shore.

The coastal districts were among the poorest in Tanzania and heavily dependent on the marine resources. While the situation was largely the same in both mainland Tanzania and in Zanzibar, the vulnerability was higher in Zanzibar, given its dependence on the marine environment. Poverty and decreasing fish stocks in the near-shore led to increased pressure on the resource and the spread of unsustainable fishing methods and gear.

Marine and coastal resources have traditionally been over-exploited or sub-optimally utilized while they have the potential to contribute directly to improved incomes and reduced vulnerability to external shocks. There was also an opportunity to increase local empowerment, and improve the definition of property rights and responsibilities towards improved and sustainable use of the resource base.

Tanzania is signatory to a range of regional and international conventions and agreements as well as national legislation regarding sustainable use of marine and coastal resources. They were either not implemented or implemented in an ad hoc manner. The conventions included the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Convention of Biodiversity (CBD); regional conventions such as the Nairobi Convention³ and national policies and legislation such as the Fisheries Acts of the two sides of the Union, the Deep Sea Fishing Authority Act of 1989 (not ratified); the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act of 1988, the National Integrated Coastal Environmental Management Strategy (NICEMS), the Marine Parks and Reserves Act and the National Environmental Management Act (2004).

Focus of the Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project (MACEMP)

The project design was preceded by about one year's worth of analyses on ecology, fisheries, financial sustainability, community fisheries, joint management of marine areas. A synthesis of these studies is provided in the publication: *Blueprint: Sustaining the Marine Environment or Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar*. The design was consistent with international best practice for environmental or marine and coastal management projects. The Coral Triangle Initiative in East Asia and the Pacific supported by multiple donors draws many parallels with the MACEMP.

The project development objective according to the World Bank's Project Appraisal Document is:

“to strengthen the sustainable management and use of the Borrower's Exclusive Economic Zone, territorial seas, and coastal resources resulting in enhanced revenue collection, reduced threats to the environment, better livelihoods for participating coastal communities living in the Coastal Districts and improved institutional arrangements.”

The objective was conceptualized to respond to the issues outlined in the previous section. In order to achieve the development objective, the MACEMP took a three-pronged approach. The first two approaches had a strong emphasis on improving governance: in the EEZ through the establishment of a common governance regime; and in the near-shore through a comprehensive system of marine managed areas. Complementary strategies included improved MCS, scaling up ICM, and empowering communities to manage their own resource base. The third strategy focused on providing livelihoods and building capacity in the communities to manage those livelihoods sustainably.

The design had a multi-sectoral, decentralized, comprehensive approach covering offshore, nearshore and the coast. In order to achieve the challenging goals, the project should ideally have been a long term project. The multi-sectoral and multi-tiered nature of the project exacerbated implementation difficulties faced by agencies expected to mainstream the project within existing work programs. Individual components and funding allocated to each is outlined in Table 1.

Table 1. Project components and Cost

COMPONENTS	Appraisal Estimate (US \$m)	Actual (US\$m)	Percentage of Appraisal
Sound Management of the Exclusive Economic Zone	15.40	16.51	107.21
Sound Management of the Coastal and Marine Environment	26.25	22.41	85.37
Coastal Community Action Fund	10.97	10.73	97.81
Project Implementation support	7.38	8.68	117.62
Community contribution	1.00	1.00	100
Project Cost	61.75	59.32	96.06
Project Preparation Facility (PPF)	1.00	1.00	100
Total Project Cost	62.75	60.32	96.13

Key Outcomes

The most significant outcome is the establishment of a common governance regime for the EEZ. The project facilitated the reform of the Deep Sea Fishing Authority Act of 1998 to include a benefit sharing formula between the mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar which was acceptable to both sides. The lack of such a benefit sharing formula was the key reason for the non-operationalization of this Act for over a decade. Pursuant to the legislative reforms, the project supported the establishment of the DSFA as a semi-independent authority. The leadership of the DSFA rotates between the mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. The institution is now a member of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), thus improving its credibility and transparency. The DSFA has been successful in generating US\$9.2 annually since its establishment in 2009. These reforms are elements of sound governance of the EEZ leading to economic efficiency and ecological sustainability. Beyond the MACEMP, the government has adopted the same formula of benefit sharing for the exploitation of offshore oil and gas.

A second key outcome is the improved governance of the nearshore areas through strengthening the management of existing marine protected areas (MPAs) and the establishment of new areas. On the mainland, MACEMP facilitated the strengthening of, among others, the Mafia Island Marine Park and Mnazi Bay Marine Park. It also helped set up the new Coelacanth MPA along the north coast of mainland Tanzania. In Zanzibar, the project strengthened management of,

among others the Menai Bay Conservation Area (MBCA) and the Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area (MIMCA). Their boundaries were expanded in response to the demand of communities in areas adjacent to the MCAs. New conservation areas supported for gazettelement include: Changu-Bawe Marine Conservation Area (CHABAMCA) and Tumbatu Marine Conservation Area (TUMCA). The largest marine conservation area established with support from the MACEMP is the Pemba Channel Conservation Area (PECCA). According to IUCN, the coral reefs of PECCA are among the most diverse in East Africa. However, the report discusses a range of threats including climate change, unsustainable fishing such as seine netting and the spread of Crown of Thorns predation⁴. This conservation area includes the migratory route of Humpback whales travelling northward from Comoros and Madagascar to Malindi , Kenya. The regulation of PECCA as an MCA and promoting sound management of the coral reefs and other marine ecosystems is a key biodiversity outcome.

With regard to governance, a successful institutional reform supported under MACEMP was to promote a co-management model where MCAs are managed in collaboration by the government and communities. This model was to a large extent successful in moving from an open access regime into a managed access regime. Representatives of Fishermen's Association serve on the Board of the MCAs along with representatives of the Marine Conservation Unit (MCU) and Department of Fisheries. Other MCAs such as Mnemba Island Conservation Area are managed privately with a contribution provided to the communities dependent on the MCA. An interesting observation by evaluation teams is that communities in Zanzibar requested their fishing grounds to be included in an MCA. The boundaries were then determined by a through consultative process.

According to the government's evaluation report, on the Mainland, “ *an area of about 647km² was gazetted as MPAs during the project implementation period, bringing the total area of territorial seas under protection to 2,173 km², compared with an area of about 1,526 km² that was gazetted before the project became effective. In proportionate terms, this represents an increase of 6.5%. In Zanzibar, the support provided by the project led to the extension of Menai Bay Conservation Area (MBCA) by 2.3% from 401km² to 700km², and Mnemba - Chwaka Bay Marine Conservation Area (MIMCA) by 0.9% from 56km² to 290km². This resulted in the extension of the overall Zanzibar territorial Sea under protection by 7.3% from 526km² to 2,239km²*”. The increase in the area placed under protection is a reflection of both the ownership of government to take initiative for sound governance of nearshore areas and also the willingness of communities that depend on these resources to embrace more sustainable exploitation measures.

In terms of management effectiveness, the project assisted both sides of the Union to undertake monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS). According to the same report, MCU was assisted in carrying out 2,166 patrols in the protected areas. During these patrols, 3,509 illegal fishermen with 506 illegal gears were captured and sent to trial. According to the government's evaluation, 1,121 land and sea based patrols were conducted and 561 apprehended. TSH 2.16 million was collected in fines.

The government's evaluation report concludes that the project has resulted in the following outcomes: improved management effectiveness in the MPAs; improved networks and coordination of MPAs; increased fish catch in the MPAs and adjacent areas; improved livelihoods of communities in and around the MPAs; improved welfare of the park residents and fishermen; increased awareness on legal means of utilizing marine and coastal resources to protect the environment; increased compliance and partnership with communities within and outside the MPAs; improved MPA governance system with full participation and involvement of women in the management of MPAs; increased areas for investment in the reserves (tented camps and eco-lodges); and increased visitors and tourists in parks and reserves.

The project aimed to expand the territorial area under management to a target of 10%. The project succeeded in increasing management effectiveness of territorial seas from 4% to 10.3% at end of project¹. The breakdown by geographical area shows that mainland's territorial seas under effective protection increased from 4.1% to 5.9%, while territorial seas under effective protection increased from 1.4% to 6.1% in Zanzibar. Improved effective protection and governance of the near-shore areas resulted from: (i) strengthening of existing MPAs through increased boundary demarcation and establishment of new areas; (ii) enhanced capacity to undertake controls and surveillance of MPAs; (iii) enhanced enforcement network of MPAs; (iv) improved working environment and equipment; (v) targeted high-level training and exchange programs; (vi) improved sensitization and awareness among community members; and (vii) improved coordination among network of MPAs.

Figure 2 depicts the MCAs in Pemba island and Figure 3 depicts the MCAs in Unguja island (Pemba and Unguja islands comprise Zanzibar).

Figure 2. Pemba Channel Conservation Area (PECCA) and populations in each Administrative Area (Sources: DSFA/MCU/Department of Lands)

¹ At the time of the project closing, the total number of MMAs in mainland and Zanzibar was 23. Based on the METT assessment form, each of these MMA obtained a total score regarding their level of effective protection or management. Only the MMAs which achieved a score of 55 and above were included in the total proportion of territorial seas under effective protection or management. Only Tanga Coelacanth Marine Park (TCMP) and the surrounding Marine Reserves achieved a score below 55.




Figure 3. MCAs in Unguja island, Zanzibar – Source DSFA/MCU/Department of Land




Table 2 indicates the different MCAs in Zanzibar and the populations dependent on the resources. Given the large numbers who are dependent, it was imperative that co-management models for governance were adopted. Table 3 depicts the marine protected areas and marine reserves that were placed under sound governance with support from MACEMP on the mainland.

Table 2. MCAs in Zanzibar and Dependent Population (2012) – Source: Daudi Pandu, Assistant Coordinator, MCU, Zanzibar

MCAs (Unguja Island)	Population
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	Total	Male	Female
Menai Bay Marine Conservation Area	78,343	38,417	39,926
Changu-Bawe Marine Conservation Area	23,069	11,335	11,734
Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area	36,989	18,627	18,362
Tumca Marine Conservation Area	58,616	28,632	29,984
Pemba Channel Conservation Area	58,616	28,632	29,984

Table 3. Area of the Territorial Sea Protected in the Mainland with MACEMP support
(Source: MPRU)

Name of the Protected Area	Area under conservation (Km²)	Area of Territorial Seas (Km²)	% of Territorial Seas under Protection
Kendwa Island Marine Reserve	5.30		
Inner & Outer Sinda Island Marine Reserve	1.80		
Inner & Outer Makatube Island Marine Reserve	7.78		
Shungumbili Island Marine Reserves	4.20		
Nyororo Island Marine Reserve	21.0		
Mbarakuni Island Marine Reserve	3.80		
Kirui Island Marine Reserve	36.10		
Ulenge Island Marine Reserve	3.16		
Mwewe Island Marine Reserve	0.40		
Kwale Island Marine Reserve	12.13		
Tanga Coelacanth Marine Park	552.17		
Total	647.84	33,200	1.95
Percentage of total marine area currently under management (includes MPAs which existed prior to MACEMP)			5.9

Conservation of mangrove ecosystems are recognized as providing a buffer in the event of tsunamis and storm surges. **Box 1** outlines some of the key conservation initiatives supported by MACEMP to protect mangroves Eco-systems in Zanzibar and mainland.

Box 1. Conservation activities supported by MACEMP

In Zanzibar key achievements are:

A. *completion of Mangrove inventory - 2009*

B. *Socio-economic study for Mangrove management - 2009*

C. *Completion of Mangrove Management Plan.- 2009*

D. *Afforestation of Mangroves: 527 ha of Mangrove forests replanted*

E. *Conservation groups: 127 conservation committees have been established, coordinated and involved in mangroves management.*

F. *By laws: In 12 pilot villages meetings to develop village by-laws have been conducted.*

G. *Beekeeping: Total of 15,000 installed in mangroves. One liter of honey made from mangrove flowers is sold at Tanzanian Shillings 40,000 Tanzania shilling (equiv. US \$ 25)*

Source: Yusuf Kombo, MACEMP Manager, Zanzibar

In Mainland Tanzania, the project strengthened and updated the Forestry Department's Mangrove Management Plan, which is now in use. A total of 225,219 mangrove seedlings were planted; 14,600 in Kinondoni Municipality, 98,759 in Tanga City and 11,860 in Muheza District. In the Rufiji Delta area, 152 ha of abandoned rice farms were replanted with mangrove seedlings of various species, including *Rhizophora mucronata*, *Ceriops tagal* and *Buruguiera gymnorhiza* species with an estimated 80% survival rate. In addition, the project helped maintain and restore environmental integrity by supporting the implementation of 79 (31 in Mainland and 48 in Zanzibar) community conservation subprojects in the amount of TShs. 598,19 million. This allowed the beneficiary groups to undertake mangrove conservation, conservation of sea turtles, tree planting, awareness on environmental conservation, construction of energy saving stoves, beach management and erosion control, coral reef management and conservation, rehabilitation and conservation of cultural heritage sites, and construction of latrines along the beaches for tourists.

Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Implementation Completion Report, December, 2012.

southern coast, while others largely ineffective. The basis of the concept is that the communities are empowered to manage the resource base upon which they depend. They are trained to use sustainable gear and methods, to carry out monitoring and patrols in collaboration with the department of fisheries, the MPA and the district authorities. The mixed success may result from the level of capacity building provided to the communities.

The MACEMP provided the district level with capacity building to promote Integrated Coastal Management (ICM), replicating lessons and methodology from the Tanzania Coastal Management Partnership (TCMP). Support was also provided to the National Land Use Planning Commission (NLUPC) to carry out Resource planning and mapping aimed at providing the districts with the tools for decision-making. Other support included the establishment of community banks, design of mangrove management plans and promotion of public private partnerships for seaweed farming. The success of these initiatives appears to be mixed depending on ownership, capacity, stakeholder interest and the level of facilitation. On the mainland, the districts where the project started implementation as pilots and received support from the Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF) and WWF appear to have benefited the most.

In Zanzibar, main successes in the near-shore appear to be in co-management of the MCAs, reduction in conflicts between the authorities and the communities, improved conservation of mangroves and the public private partnerships (PPP) to promote the cultivation of seaweed. Tanzania is now the biggest exporter of seaweed in Africa and the number of private partners in Zanzibar has grown from 1 to 12. Seaweed was being grown and exported in Mafia Island as well. But it was reported that a disease had impacted the seaweed in the recent years. Insufficient data exists on the percentage by which income poverty has been reduced in the seaweed farmers.

In some ways the livelihoods component was the most complex of the three components. It was however, the most popular, providing a direct grant to communities to initiate or strengthen a livelihood. The rationale for including this component was strong including: the high incidence of poverty along the coast; fit with the government's policy to devolve power to the local level. The involvement of the districts and building their capacity was critical if the resource base was to be governed effectively. Finally, there was a need to respond to the Bank's social safeguard on involuntary resettlement. This safeguard specified that where communities whose livelihood is affected through a Bank supported activity, they need to receive compensation. In the original design only communities living in the targeted districts where conservation of marine biodiversity initiatives were supported by the project were eligible to receive benefits from component 3 of the project.

When the project was scaled up to cover all coastal districts, it was purely based on demand, political economy and equity in the provision of a livelihood to all those who lived along the coastal margin. In the original costing only about 400 community sub-projects were expected to

be funded at an average cost per subproject of US\$20,000. After the scaling up, the number of subprojects almost doubled to 797. The available funds for the component increased by 12% only, thus reducing the average funds available per subproject to US\$ 11,076 (55% of original amount). According to the Socio Economic Impact Assessment (SEIA) sustainability of many of the financed subprojects is questionable, with significant variation of their financial viability by project type. According to the report, around 60% of subprojects are doing well, but the remaining 40% may be considered as failed.


Corsi et al have noted the achievement of key project indicators as follows:

Table 4. Achievement of key performance indicators

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Actual
URT Revenue generation to EEZ Authority from offshore fisheries (US\$M/yr).	US\$2m	US\$10m	US\$9.3m
Fisheries Information Management System supplied with increased observation data (vessel catches)	1,000	7,500	8,708
Management effectiveness of territorial seas increased	4%	10%	10.3%
Proportion of households perceiving an improvement in their welfare and economic status.	-	80	85%
Number of people participating in community saving schemes	-	-	832

Governance.

Given the project's focus on sound governance, it is relevant to assess the elements of governance as related to the project's design and performance. Figure 4 outlines key elements that comprise good governance based on definitions used by the World Bank, UNESCO and other development agencies.

Figure 2. Elements of Sound Governance

Although not identified in the figure above, which is a generic model of what constitutes good governance, in the case of an ecosystem such as the marine and coastal environment, a significant focus is placed on reducing open access. Open access leads to unsustainable exploitation of the resource, which in turn leads to the destruction of a species or an ecosystem. Transition from an open access state into a managed environment where resources will be exploited sustainably under a managed regime is a clear outcome of good governance. Managed access to a resource typically leads to long-term sustainability of the marine resource base and maintain resilience of fish stocks to absorb controlled levels of utilization. In the case of governance of offshore fisheries the project aimed to achieve improved resource rent through strengthened control and enforcement mechanisms and through incentives for sustainable resource use. This component of the project aimed to assist the government of Tanzania achieve both national and global targets set by the World Sustainable Development to maintain and restore national and transboundary fish stocks to sustainable levels.

Ownership is key to the success of any project. Government commitment to the project was at a very high level during preparation of the project and initial years of implementation. The availability of strong champions on either side of the Union enabled dialogue, negotiation and agreement on key policy, legal and institutional reforms, such as the reform and operationalization of the DSFA Act. However, this ownership deteriorated during a restructuring

of key government institutions. The low level of ownership led to reduced commitment, low level of understanding of the project and delays in decision-making.

The level of ownership differed across the Union, between the mainland and Zanzibar, across participating agencies within sectors and among the leadership at the District level. The reasons for the different levels of commitment differed depending on levels of ownership, capacity, knowledge of project goals and the benefits to the locality or sector.

As an example, conservation and sustainable development of the marine areas is critically important to Zanzibar, given their dependence on coastal and marine resources. Both the Director in charge of the project and the Manager in charge of implementation were in position for the duration of the project. After the manager left the project upon being promoted to a higher level, one of the focal points for implementation was engaged as the new manager. These safeguards enabled Zanzibar to achieve most of the outcomes with a certain degree of ease.

On the mainland, this project was one of many, and within the fisheries sector Lake Victoria Fisheries always captured the attention of the main implementing agency. Marine fisheries were overall undervalued, with the result that agencies in charge lacked adequate staff, capacity, data, and transparency over the issue of licenses. In such an environment, changes in leadership affected the project in a serious manner, leaving important policy and institutional initiatives to the last part of the project.

Most evaluators agree on the value of sound monitoring for improved governance. A good M & E system would allow adaptation of the project based on performance and lessons learned. During the early stages of the project, a facilitation team was put in place, referred to as the EEZ Governance Facilitation Team (EGFT). Their primary role was to facilitate negotiations towards common governance of the EEZ, the reform of the Deep Sea Fishing Authority Act and establishing the Authority. The team had a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Specialist who made a credible effort to collect data from the participating agencies. Her effort was unsuccessful due to a range of reasons including a reluctance within agencies to share data and because she was considered an outsider. The government then decided to mainstream M&E within the ministries. This initiative was not successful, with the result the project's successes or failures cannot be effectively assessed.

The government's own evaluation and the World Bank's evaluation of the performance in this project is noted to be mixed, during preparation and implementation; between the two sides of the Union; between different sectors and between the different tiers of government. Variance of capacity in different sectoral agencies also resulted in mixed performance. At the district level, those districts which had benefitted from other donor supported projects and the World Bank/JSDF/WWF initiative achieved greater benefits from the project through higher level of engagement and a longer period of implementation.

The project and its benefits were recognized and highly appreciated by all stakeholders in Zanzibar. This is no surprise, given the significant support received from the project for improved governance marine and coastal resources for their livelihood and to the economy in general. There was a certain sense of urgency in Zanzibar to achieve project goals even amidst capacity constraints. Even in Zanzibar, the performance was mixed among different sectors in government. For example, the department of forests managed to implement policy, legislative and institutional strengthening to govern the mangroves, the conservation of which is of high significance for mitigating tsunamis and storm surges. Highlights of achievements are outlined in Box 1.

On the mainland, performance suffered from a lower level of interest and commitment, particularly after a series of restructuring initiatives in government with significant turn-over at leadership levels in key implementing agencies.

Financial sustainability is in the context of the MMAs, a steady and predictable flow of annual funding sufficient to maintain the quality of the underlying resource base. Corsi et al reviewing the performance of beneficiaries find a certain degree of sustainability demonstrated in Zanzibar, with 72 percent of operating costs covered by own revenue while in the mainland only 30% of operating costs are shown as covered by own resources. However, it is not clear whether the percentage of revenues that are deposited in the Conservation and Development Fund managed by MPRU has been accounted for in this 30%. In addition MPRU reportedly receives grants from private sector. Whether these contributions have been part of the formula that derived the 30% is also unclear. At the Union level, it appears that the DSFA has collected double the amount of revenue required for operating costs. Corsi et al note DSFA revenue collection and operational costs in Table 6.

Table 6: DSFA Own Revenues and Operational Costs (USD)

Fiscal Year	Own Revenues Generated	Operational Costs	% of Annual Operational Costs of DSFA covered by Own Revenues
2005/2006	1,248,997		
2006/2007	1,514,410		
2007/2008	1,177,510		
2008/2009	977,619		
2009/2010 /a	1,305,983	1,545,536	85%
2010/2011	1,314,760	1,239,499	106%
2011/2012	1,222,510	1,114,819	110%

2012/2013 /b	484,440	-	-
Total	9,246,229		

\a DSFA started issuing fishing licenses in February 2010

\b 2012/2013 covers the period July 1, 2012 to January 31, 2013; operational costs not yet available.

According to the government's evaluation report, "*overall administrative costs in respect of project management amounted to 11.8% of total project cost, which is not a significant deviation from the normal norms (8%-10%)*". The overall efficiency of resource use may be argued in a positive or negative way. With two sets of governance frameworks to support, the costs of the operation are obviously high. However, the benefits of having a sound governance model for the offshore fisheries and a revenue sharing formula that is being adopted beyond the scope of the fisheries are yet to be realized. Benefits from an improved governance of the MMA system will take another decade to be realized. The sustainability of investments at the local level is not clear. Reports mentioned earlier indicate that the beneficiaries of the livelihood projects perceive the support positively. Had the project leveraged more time, there would have been a better chance to assess the degree of efficiency.

The relationship between political leaders and society, markets and economy play an important role in impacting governance. In the case of the MACEMP, a decision was taken by project leadership to rapidly scale up the project to cover all coastal districts on the mainland. The decision was in response to the pressure placed on implementing agencies by elected representatives of the people. In the initial design, the project only targeted 3 districts as a pilot, with the recommendation that activities will be scaled up to other districts based on lessons learned. The criteria for selection of the districts were outlined in project documents. Requirements included baseline studies, resource assessments, land use plans, Community Fisheries Management Plans, and establish BMUs. This type of preparatory studies were essential for efficiency in, carrying out MCS and fishery patrols and using CVF grants prudently. The demand for scaling up to all coastal districts is not surprising when the majority of coastal residents were poor and the resources of the project appeared to be unrelated to the needs of a few districts and Zanzibar. A quick reallocation of funds was carried out with support of the Bank to accede to the demand. But the time and capacity required to implement all these activities effectively was not considered by the decision-makers.

The project provided different types of livelihoods to coastal communities. They ranged from fisheries to mariculture and agriculture, depending on the interests of the beneficiaries. Given the paucity of data, it is difficult to ascertain the reduction of income poverty. The World Bank carried out a beneficiaries' perception survey of sub-projects supported by MACEMP. The findings of the Socio economic assessment concludes that:

“44% of the surveyed beneficiaries reported to have seen significant welfare improvements while 41% perceived moderate welfare gains; (ii) 11 % reported no change in their welfare; and (iii) only four percent indicated deteriorating welfare. More specifically the assessment revealed that MACEMP subprojects contributed to positive impacts on beneficiaries within the following areas: i) improved food security; ii) enhanced investments and savings; iii) improved fishing practices; iv) adoption of new and better technologies; v) creation of new opportunities for employment; vi) enhanced local government revenue; and vii) inculcation of entrepreneurship mentality”.

According to the Socio-economic study over 85% of beneficiaries perceived significant improvement in their well-being and economic status. Majority of the beneficiaries have seen their savings and incomes increased with savings ranging from TShs. 10,000 to TShs. 200,000. The savings have enabled them to pay their children’s school fees and medical bills. Findings of studies conducted by the Bank and the government are similar, indicating that beneficiaries of the livelihood projects are satisfied with the support received. Sustainability of the projects may be questioned but at the current time there is no indication for concern. The issue will be discussed later in the paper.

According to MCU, in Zanzibar, the key challenges for the success of sub projects included: the high number of beneficiaries demanding projects; conflicts and different objectives among the members; low level of understanding of the project among some members; lack of accountability; and variance in work and production.

The third level of governance sought to put in place is empowerment of communities to manage the resources they depend on. This has been achieved through the establishment of Beach Management Units (BMUs) on the mainland, support to the Fishermen’s Associations in Zanzibar and Seaweed farming women’s associations in Zanzibar. Additionally, districts have been facilitated with Resource Assessment Capability and Spatial Planning Capability in order to manage the resources more effectively. Using a participatory planning model, all coastal communities in all coastal districts have been provided with livelihood support. The sustainability of this support has not been assessed effectively. In some areas where the level of capacity of the communities is higher and the level of support provided to the communities had been consistent and of a higher level, the sustainability of the livelihood has a greater chance.

One governance issue which was not identified at the design stage of the project, but became of significance soon after implementation, was dynamiting of near-shore fisheries. Several measures were supported by the MACEMP and the government including increased patrols, joint patrols and increased MCS. The numbers of violations increased and the numbers of perpetrators captured also increased. However, the incidence of dynamiting prevailed except in the MCAs in Zanzibar and in some of the marine parks on the mainland. As mentioned earlier, dynamiting has virtually been eliminated in the Mafia Island Marine Park. The incidences reported are mainly in the Tanga area and in the Dar es Salaam area. It is of interest that the Tanga area was supported by IUCN to promote participatory co-management for at least a decade. While dynamiting was virtually absent during this period, it again became virulent as soon as the project had closed. Dynamiting was not raised as an issue by any of the stakeholders when the MACEMP was

designed. However, the issue raised its head a couple of years into implementation. The project supported joint patrols and enhanced MCS on the nearshore. But it continues to be a troubling issue in Tanga and in Dar es Salaam. One theory which has remained for some time is that wealthy businessmen in Dar es Salaam are providing poor fishermen with dynamite or material to manufacture home-made bombs. If this is the case, the issue also becomes a security issue. Other theories include the fact that fisheries officials either turn a blind eye or are also involved in the violations. Neither theory is substantiated. Participation of fishermen in monitoring and patrol of the fisheries in the co-management or BMU model seems to be the best option to reduce this issue.

Lessons Learned.

From the above discussion, we may draw some lessons which would be useful for those designing similar projects in similar contexts.

One of the key goals of the project was to establish a common governance regime in the Exclusive Economic Zone of URT. This had been attempted in the '80s and the Deep Sea Fishing Act had been passed in 1987 by the Parliament of URT. However, the Act was never operationalized. Undertaking the reform of this Act and the policy and institutional framework was a significant risk given the lack of agreement by the two sides of the Union on key provisions. However, the rewards of effective management of high value migratory fisheries, especially Tuna, the economic and ecological benefits were significant. The collapse of these valuable fish stocks through ad hoc issuance of licenses by both sides of the Union and a possible 'race to the bottom' would have national, regional and global significance. The support of the highest level of government in the Union opened a window of opportunity for MACEMP to support key negotiations bringing about an equitable agreement to benefit sharing that was instrumental to operationalizing the DSFA Act. The rewards are seen in shared, equitable and sustainable governance of the offshore fisheries.

While Tanzania has benefitted from the support of many bilateral donors those projects are usually not mainstreamed into government structures. Procurement, disbursement and financial management are managed by a Project Manager appointed by the donor reporting to the donor. In the case of the World Bank, the funds are disbursed into a secure Special Account opened by the Government and use of the funds is subject to the procurement and disbursement guidelines of the Bank and those of the government. This model puts in place requisite safeguards for sound financial management but can lead to serious delays in implementation if the implementing agencies lack exposure to the Bank's and even the government's fiduciary guidelines.

The performance of the Borrower is based on the performance of the implementing agencies. In the current situation, the complexity of the context of the institutional framework makes the evaluation of performance very challenging. The performance of institutions varied widely, across the two sides of the Union, across sectors and across the different tiers of government. In Zanzibar, due to the high dependence on the marine and coastal resource base, the ownership of

the project was high throughout the project time frame. The best and the brightest officials were secured to manage the project. On the mainland, this project was one of many and the priority of the key implementing institutions was always on the Lake Victoria rather than the marine environment. At the sectoral level many participating agencies on the mainland had difficulties due to the delays in the main implementing agency. The turnover of senior staff due to restructuring led to low levels of ownership, low levels of understanding which in turn led to delays in decision-making. The turnover of staff was much less in Zanzibar. At both the sector and local levels of government, those institutions which had had exposure to working with donors performed better than those who had little or no exposure to working with donors or the Bank. On the mainland the districts which had benefited from JSDF project performed better than the other coastal districts which were included in the project through the scaling up exercise.

At the time the project was designed, there was a very strong emphasis in government and in the Bank to mainstream projects within the government structure. While the policy made sense in a generic sense, it posed a considerable challenge for institutions which were weak or new. The situation was exacerbated where new concepts such as sound governance of the EEZ, co-management of marine areas and empowerment of communities to manage resources in a sustainable way. Several mechanisms were put in place to address the weaknesses including the Exclusive Economic Zone Governance Facilitation Team (EGFT) which supported the policy, legal and institutional reforms for the establishment of the DSFA; selection of pilot districts where investments had already been made a number of donors as well as the JSDF; and partnership with WWF which also had a presence in the sub-region on monitoring and enforcement and capacity building of districts and communities. Even with these mechanisms, the mainstreaming policy resulted in significant delays in procurement, disbursement and start-up of activities at the national and local level.

The project design was complex although in keeping with international best practice for marine and coastal management and national legislation. The unique feature in URT that added to the complexity was that resources in the EEZ were managed by both sides of the Union with two parliaments, two governance structures, two separate policies and legislation. The serious risk was that unless a sound governance regime was put in place, the high value commercially exploited migratory fisheries could collapse. The situation at the time of project preparation was leading to economic and ecological losses to the country and to the region. The project also aimed to support the governance of the near-shore marine and coastal areas which provided the poor with a livelihood and food security. It also supported coastal tourism which again supported employment in the area. The project supported the government's emphasis on devolving power to the districts and communities.

The complexity of the project reflected the complexity of the context. It would not have been possible to focus only on one side of the Union if harmonization of the laws and establishment of a common governance regime was a key goal of the project. In terms of the near-shore, multiple

agencies had mandate for managing resources of the coast and marine areas. If they were not included there would have been no opportunity to manage the conflicts that would arise over access to the resource base. While these are contextual issues, the number of stakeholders and beneficiaries did pose a burden on the main implementing agencies on each side of the Union. While most of these institutions had been supported by different donors they did not have sufficient staff experienced to manage a project of the size and scale of MACEMP.

The original design of the project activities were aimed at 3 districts (Mafia, Kilwa and Rufiji) and surrounding villages. These had been supported by several donors and by the Bank (through JSDF). In Zanzibar, all coastal areas in both Unguja and Pemba were included. Lessons learned from the pilot districts were to be used in scaling up project activities to other districts based on specific criteria. However, during implementation, there was overwhelming demand from the political level to scale the project up to cover the whole coast. And this was endorsed without: (a) waiting for lessons from the pilot districts; or (b) carrying out the preparatory studies for identifying appropriate districts and their capacity. The project was supported by both IDA and GEF. Therefore, the original design selected areas where marine biodiversity was unique, poverty and conflicts of resource use were a threat to the conservation of this biodiversity. The provision of livelihoods was a compensation mechanism as a response to Bank safeguards. While poverty would be reduced through good governance of offshore and nearshore fisheries; improved management of the coastal areas; and empowerment of the local level, reducing income poverty was not a development objective of this project. The scaling up of the project to all coastal districts did not take into consideration the basis of the project design.

The government's evaluation report notes that "empowering communities with the requisite resources and skills to undertake business ventures enhances their ability to manage projects and further improve their livelihoods. The project's community groups benefitted significantly from project interventions, but funding shortfalls and marketing constraints, hampered smooth running of their operations". The scaling up without ensuring that capacity is built in the relevant districts to receive and implement the project and ensuring that there was sufficient resources posed a real challenge.

In both mainland and Zanzibar, the scope of marine protected areas was scaled up, with boundaries expanded in Zanzibar and new protected areas gazetted and established on both sides. They include Tanga Coelacanth Marine Park (mainland), Pemba Channel Conservation Area (PECCA on Pemba Island, Zanzibar), Tumbatu Marine Conservation Area (TUMCA) (Unguja Island, Zanzibar), Chwaka Bay/Jozani (Unguja, Zanzibar) and Kojani Marine Conservation Area. The success of the scaling up varied depending on the resources available for management. Where co-management models worked well, it was possible to reduce the cost of management. Where the co-management models were only partially successful, scaling up posed a challenge

for implementing agencies. A long term strategy for financial sustainability remains a priority for the MPAs and MCAs.

During the initial years of project implementation, responsibility of M&E rested with the EGFT. After two years of this arrangement, the government decided to adopt a decentralized model where each participating agency was required to do the monitoring of activities and report back to management every quarter. Some of the agencies such as MPRU, MCU had their own databases and were expected to provide a report to the Bank twice a year. Fisheries had the MCS database and the community investments were monitored by TASAF given their responsibility for Component 3. However, this mainstreaming of M&E did not result in a sound tracking of implementation progress against the project's performance indicators.

Co-management models led to successful joint Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) in some areas in the south of mainland Tanzania and in Zanzibar. These models were to a large extent effective as a response to the spread of dynamite fishing along the coast. However, in other areas such as Tanga and Dar es Salaam dynamite fishing continued and at times were reported as being increased. It was the government's position that the different community institutional mechanisms such as Beach Management Units (BMUs) were successful in controlling the dynamiting. The private sector, in particular those involved in tourism regularly monitored the dynamiting and were of the view that little or nothing was done by the government about this serious issue. When the project was being designed a number of participatory decision meetings were held, with no mention of the dynamiting. This may have been due to the eradication of dynamiting through the success of the Tanga Coastal Zone Project implemented by IUCN for at least a decade. Unfortunately two years after the MACEMP started implementation, the dynamiting was noticed in the same area where the IUCN project was active. The MACEMP supported joint patrols, established the Tanga Coelacanth Park and improved capacity of the fisheries personnel to carry out MCS. Most importantly, the setting up of the BMUs and Village Fisheries Committees are seen as being a deterrent to unsustainable fishing.

The government's evaluation report also outlines some factors outside the control of the implementing agencies that affected project performance. They include frequent changes of Permanent Secretaries on both sides of the Union affecting timing of approval of payments; Somali piracy which affected the inflow of vessels into the EEZ, thereby reducing revenue to the DSFA; delay in accepting the concept of conservation at the community level. The report also notes that once perception had changed community members participated fully in most patrol exercises intended to track and reduce illegal fishing activities. Another internal issue noted in the report is the lack of incentives for government staff working on the project on a full time basis. This last issue did crop up in many meetings with government staff. However, most donors as well as the World Bank do not make payments to government staff to carry out what is considered to be their job. The government also does not wish to pay allowances for project staff since this would create an anomaly between those who work on donor funded projects as

opposed to others who work on government led initiative. The issue of salaries is under review by a Committee of the Minister of Finance. It is a difficult issue common in many developing nations.

Conclusion

One issue that was discussed in detail by evaluators was the complexity of the project. Interestingly however, the complexity in the design mirrored the complexity of the context. First, at the Union level, common governance of the EEZ could not be achieved without the intensive involvement of both the mainland and Zanzibar. Second, if the project was to take a sectoral focus, namely fisheries, both the Union level and the nearshore which provided a livelihood and food security for all coastal communities needed to be included. Further, a focus on fisheries would require involvement of marine parks and conservation areas, the forest department that manage the mangroves and the districts that have the mandate with revenue collection within their jurisdiction. One might wonder why include NEMC and NLUPC. They were not beneficiaries but service providers to carry out resource planning and ICM planning. If the idea is to build capacity in the country, then agencies that carry out these functions need to be involved rather than total dependence on specialists from overseas. Specialists may be engaged as needed to help the national institutions.

The Bank's safeguard policies⁵ require that if Bank supported activities had an impact on livelihoods of communities, then those communities needed to be compensated. Lastly the same policies mandated that if Bank supported activities included areas where antiquities were situated, those needed to be protected and where possible restored. Should the design have focused only on governance of offshore fisheries? At the time of project preparation, the subject was only limited to a law that had been passed by Parliament but was non-operational due to non-participation by the government of Zanzibar. Would the client have been interested in borrowing only for an activity which only had a slim chance of success? It is not clear. We do know however, that other donors had attempted to support common governance of the offshore with little success.

The project aimed to achieve sound governance at different levels. The first level was governance of the offshore areas. Resource harvesting in the EEZ was de facto open access. Licenses were issued to Distant Water Fishing Nations on an ad hoc basis. Fisheries was not considered a Union matter, therefore both mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar issued licenses. There was no collaboration on the value of the licenses or how many licenses should be issued. Tanzania was not a participant of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) which keeps records of catch levels during seasons, vessel ownership and other important data.

On a global scale, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the FAO Compliance Agreement and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries are among the binding and non-binding agreements relating to migratory fisheries. The MACEMP facilitated the reforms to the DSFA Act which enabled the operationalization of the DSFA. A revenue sharing formula was developed to the satisfaction of the two sides of the

Union. These measures led to the establishment of the DSFA, the registering of the DSFA with the IOTC, establishment of a vessel monitoring system and record keeping of catch of the migratory fisheries in the EEZ. These steps are significant towards achieving sound governance of the EEZ of Tanzania.

As mentioned earlier, the total revenue to Tanzania after establishment in 2009 of the DSFA, reached US\$ 9.2 m. against a target of US\$10m. The establishment of the DSFA resulted in improved efficiency and transparency in revenue collection from licensing of offshore fishing vessels. Another indicator of sound governance in the EEZ as noted by the World Bank's evaluation is that by the end of the project, the fisheries management information system that includes a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) recorded 8,708 vessel catches against a target of 7,500.

On the near-shore, key activities towards achieving sound governance included the strengthening of the Marine Parks and Reserves Unit (MPRU), reform of the Fisheries Act in Zanzibar to enable the establishment of the Marine Conservation Unit (MCU), construction and rehabilitation of office premises and landing sites for fishermen, procurement of patrol boats, vehicles, computers, establishment of a monitoring system and capacity enhancement at all levels. New MPAs established on the mainland included the Tanga Coelacanth Marine Park (TACMP). In Zanzibar, new MCAs established include the Pemba Channel Conservation Area (PECCA), Changu Bawe Marine Conservation Area (CHABMCA) and Tumbatu Marine Conservation Area (TUMCA).

While it is too early to expect an improvement in the health of the ecosystem and in species, a key element of improved governance of the MPAs and MCAs is the change in approach from a top down style of government to a participatory approach in management. The approach has been particularly significant in Zanzibar where representatives of Fishermen's Associations sit on the management committee along with MCA officials and officials of the Fisheries department. This change in management style has brought about a greater sense of ownership of the resources of the MCA and sound monitoring of resource harvesting by outsiders. Another important outcome is the reduction in conflicts between the parks and villagers living adjacent to the park. One example, according to the Warden of MIMP on the mainland is the improved relations between the MIMP and the village of Jibondo. In Zanzibar improved relations are demonstrated in CHABMCA and government authorities.

On the nearshore, capacity was strengthened within a number of sectoral agencies including Fisheries, Marine Parks, Forestry department and Antiquities department. At the local level, the district authorities and community institutions received support. In Zanzibar, Fisheries Associations were strengthened to participate in patrols and monitoring. On the mainland the Beach Management Units (MBUs) were established and strengthened. The livelihood support provided to coastal communities, generated ownership of the project, enhanced knowledge of conservation and protection of the areas against outside encroachment.

Having said this, building capacity is a long term process. While an important step was taken to build human capacity in these multiple agencies, strengthening the institutions will require continued support over time to ensure that the investment in capacity is sustained. Significant

institutional impact at the local level was achieved in original pilot districts (e.g., in Mafia where BMUs are operating with a higher degree of success, including strong leadership and Government support). The new districts included in the scaling up exercise face challenges in lack of capacity, lower level of organization and training. Additionally, the problems of inter-institutional coordination and internal dysfunction associated with unusually high turnover of senior Government staff (PS) and key technical/other staff (M&E), resulted in a partial success in achieving sound governance of the nearshore.

Sound governance of an MMA system includes the policy, legislation, monitoring and financial sustainability. The MACEMP provided much needed support to the MMA systems in mainland and in Zanzibar for monitoring, patrol and enforcement of the regulations. While the establishment of these systems is a success in terms of governance, in terms of financial sustainability the project has not been successful. Government revenue to support these systems is very low. Revenue from the MPAs and MCAs is also insufficient for efficient management of the systems. It is therefore unfortunate that the government was unable or unwilling to establish the Marine Legacy Fund (MLF) which is a tool that could ensure stable, long-term financing for marine and coastal conservation and sustainable resource management. Some reviewers are of the view that the MLF is a good concept but for the long term. Tanzania however, is experienced with environmental, biodiversity and health trust funds all of which are managed by a Board of trustees. In the forest sector, the Eastern Arc Mountains Trust Fund set up with support from the World Bank and with seed funding from the Global Environmental Trust Fund took a long time to achieve sustainability. However, it is now a credible entity. There are no examples however, where both sides of the Union are contributing to a single fund. There was a proposal from Zanzibar towards the end of the project to set up the MLF in Zanzibar and that the fully contribution required by GEF would be made by Zanzibar. It is not clear what became of this proposal. Perhaps that would be a sound interim option, given some obvious challenges with operating one fund.

Key reasons for the failure of establishing the MLF include the requirement of a contribution of US\$750,000 from government; the structure envisaged was independent, without control of any government entity; and MPRU has its own fund called the Conservation and Development Fund leading to a lack of interest in the MLF. It is possible that this fund may be reformed to include some of the concepts of independence and transparency and Zanzibar may establish its own fund. There is also the potential for champions outside of government to assist in the establishment of a MLF. The failure to establish the MLF within the time frame of the project is however a lost opportunity which will impact financial sustainability.

With regard to overall sustainability, some outcomes are clearly sustainable, such as the reforms to the policy, legislation and institutional reforms relating to the DSFA. Potential for financial sustainability is high given that its income is more than double the operational costs. The reduced risk to high value marine biodiversity due to a well-managed EEZ is significant to the national, regional and global levels. Tanzania's participation in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) raises its profile and credibility in the Distant Water Fishing Nations. The strengthening and expansion of the MMA systems on both mainland Tanzania and in Zanzibar, including the establishment of co-management systems has greatly improved governance of the near-shore

areas in some geographical locations. In general improved governance on the mainland is noted within the districts included in the original design of the project. Other areas which received reduced level of support within a shorter time frame are still facing problems of unsustainable resource exploitation.

In summary, it may be concluded that the MACEMP has been successful in promoting sound governance in certain areas such as in offshore fisheries and that in other areas the successes are mixed. The successes differ across the Union, across sectors and across the different tiers of government. The complexity of design reflecting the complexity of the context, high turn-over of staff, challenges of capacity, difficulties of mainstreaming, the short time frame of the project relative to the goals that it aimed to achieve, the dichotomy of poverty and biodiversity conservation and criminal elements perpetrating unsustainable fishing methods such as dynamiting were significant challenges towards sound governance. Given the significant challenges, achieving even this level of success is creditable. It is our view that there is potential to move forward on the governance agenda if the leadership is committed to building on the successes already achieved. The many lessons learned outlined in this article, should assist in the design and implementation of similar projects in the region and elsewhere.

Notes

1. Part V of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides that the EEZ is an area of not more than 200 nautical miles, where the coastal state has the rights and jurisdiction to exploit and conserve all resources
2. Deep Sea Fishing Nations (DSFN) were largely in pursuit of the valuable Tuna fisheries. Many species are threatened but there is a very high demand for these threatened species such as the Blue Fin Tuna. Malcolm Foster of the Associated Press reported in January 2013, that a 222 kilogram Blue Fin tuna was sold for \$1.76 million in the Tokyo fish market.
3. Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region (Nairobi Convention) was ratified by Tanzania on March 1, 1996.
4. IUCN, Coral Reef Resilience Assessment of the Pemba Channel Conservation Area, Tanzania, Gland, Switzerland, 2009.
5. According to the World Bank's Safeguard Policies, involuntary restriction of access to legally designated parks and protected areas that may result in adverse impacts on the livelihoods of the displaced persons need to be compensated.

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